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Avoiding a Confrontation?
HOW COURTS HAVE ERRED IN FINDING THAT
NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY IS BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF THE BRUTON DOCTRINE
Colin Miller†
INTRODUCTION
Quite obviously, what the “interlocking” nature of the codefendant’s
confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability:
If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant’s own
confession it is more likely to be true. Its reliability . . . may be
relevant to whether the confession should . . . be admitted as
evidence against the defendant . . . but cannot conceivably be
relevant to whether, assuming it cannot be admitted, the jury is
likely to obey the instruction to disregard it, or the jury’s failure to
obey is likely to be inconsequential. The law cannot command
respect if such an inexplicable exception to a supposed constitutional
imperative is adopted. Having decided Bruton, we must face the
honest consequences of what it holds.1

George Bruton and William Evans were jointly tried
before a jury on a bank robbery charge.2 After Evans was
arrested, he confessed to a postal inspector that Bruton and he
had committed the robbery.3 Although Evans did not testify at
trial, the prosecution introduced his confession against him.4
Because the confession was hearsay as to Bruton—and
therefore inadmissible against him under the rules of
evidence—the court instructed the jury to use it only as
evidence of Evans’s guilt.5 Despite the instruction, the United
States Supreme Court could not trust the jury to use the
†
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1
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1987).
2
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 125.
5
Id.
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confession against Evans and not against Bruton. The confession
had a devastating practical effect on Bruton’s defense, and the
Court found that admitting it violated his constitutional rights.6
Courts now use this “Bruton doctrine” to conclude that the
admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s
confession that facially incriminates other defendants (but is
inadmissible against them under the rules of evidence) violates
the Confrontation Clause.7
But what if Evans did not make his statement to a
person he knew to be a governmental agent? What if he made
the same statement to his mother, his brother, or his lover? Or
what if he made the same statement to his cellmate, who
turned out to be a confidential informant? Before 2004, the vast
majority of courts would have found that the admission of such
a “noncustodial” statement violated the Bruton doctrine.
Furthermore, before 2004, it would have been irrelevant
whether Evans’s confession was constitutionally reliable as
long as it was inadmissible against Bruton under the rules of
evidence. In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court held that the
admission of hearsay did not violate the Confrontation Clause
if the hearsay declarant was “unavailable” and the statement
had “adequate indicia of reliability” (i.e., if it was
constitutionally reliable).8 As the introductory excerpt from the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Cruz v. New York makes clear,
however, the Bruton doctrine is a test of constitutional
harmfulness and not a test of constitutional reliability.9 In
other words, Bruton focuses upon the damage to a defendant’s
case based upon the admission of his codefendant’s statement,
not the (un)reliability of that statement. Therefore, the
doctrine depends on the inadmissibility of codefendant
confessions combined with their harmfulness, not their
constitutional unreliability.10 Consequently, codefendant
confessions that were inadmissible but reliable under Roberts
still violated the Bruton doctrine.11

6

Id. at 128-36.
See, e.g., State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1987) (“To invoke the
Bruton doctrine, a statement must be powerfully and facially incriminating with
respect to the other defendant and must directly, rather than indirectly, implicate the
complaining defendant in the commission of the crime.”).
8
448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
9
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
7
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In its 2004 opinion in Crawford v. Washington, the
Supreme Court overruled Roberts, rejecting its reliability
analysis and holding that “[w]here testimonial statements are
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.”12 And while the Supreme Court is
still sorting out exactly which statements are “testimonial” and
which statements are “nontestimonial,” three things are clear.
First, statements like Evans’s confession to the postal inspector
are generally testimonial while statements to a mother,
brother, lover, or confidential informant generally are not.13
Second, with limited exceptions, only the admission of
testimonial hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause.14 Third,
courts presented with the issue have consistently concluded
(again, with few exceptions15) that nontestimonial hearsay now
falls outside the scope of the Bruton doctrine, with many of these
opinions handed down in 2010.16 Thus, in its 2010 opinion in
United States v. Dale, the Eighth Circuit could easily conclude
that the admission at a joint jury trial of a codefendant’s
unwitting confession to a confidential informant did not violate
the Bruton doctrine because it was nontestimonial.17
These courts, however, are missing something
apparently less clear about Crawford. Like its predecessor,
Ohio v. Roberts, it should have had no effect on the Bruton
doctrine. Because Crawford, like Roberts, sets forth a test for
constitutional reliability, it has no bearing on the Bruton
doctrine, which sets forth a test for constitutional harmfulness.
It is thus easy to see why the Crawford Court concluded that in
Cruz it answered an “entirely different question” than the one
before it: the Bruton doctrine “make[s] no claim to be a
surrogate means of assessing reliability.”18
This article argues that courts have erred in concluding
that nontestimonial statements are beyond the scope of the
Bruton doctrine in the wake of Crawford. Therefore, a
12

541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
See id. at 51 (“An accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not.”).
14
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (“It is the testimonial
character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to
traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”).
15
See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
16
See infra notes 266-80 and accompanying text.
17
614 F.3d 942, 956 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
18
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 62.
13
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codefendant’s confession to a mother, brother, or lover should
violate the Bruton doctrine to the same extent as a formal
codefendant confession to a governmental agent. Moreover, this
article asserts that even if Crawford did deconstitutionalize the
Bruton doctrine with regard to nontestimonial statements,
rendering these statements beyond the scope of the doctrine,
courts should still find that the admission of nontestimonial
statements by codefendants violates Federal Rule of Evidence
403 because their probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Part I tracks the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
Confrontation Clause before Crawford, including the Court’s
creation and refinement of the Bruton doctrine. Part II discusses
Crawford, its progeny, and the testimonial/nontestimonial
dichotomy created by the Court. Part III addresses the ways in
which lower courts have interpreted and applied the Bruton
doctrine both before Crawford and in its wake. Finally, Part IV
of this article concludes that courts should find that Crawford
had no effect on the Bruton doctrine, meaning that the
admission of nontestimonial codefendant statements can still
violate the Bruton doctrine. Further, even if the admission of
nontestimonial statements by codefendants does not violate the
Confrontation Clause, the admission still clearly violates the
rules of evidence.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S PRE-CRAWFORD CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE CASES

A.

The Road to the Bruton Doctrine
Conceptually, the Bruton doctrine represents the
convergence of two distinct lines of analysis. The first
line flows from the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation
Clause, guaranteeing the right of defendants in criminal
prosecutions to confront adverse witnesses. The second
line flows from courts’ distrust in juries’ ability to
disregard information they have already seen and
heard.
1. The Confrontation Clause

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against

2012]

AVOIDING A CONFRONTATION?

629

him.”19 In Douglas v. Alabama, the Court applied and expanded
that right in holding that the introduction of a nontestifying
coparticipant’s statement may violate the Sixth Amendment
where the defendant does not have the opportunity to crossexamine the declarant about these inculpatory statements.20
The Douglas holding is particularly strong since the confession
at issue was introduced to the jury but not actually admitted
into evidence against the defendant.
In Douglas, Jesse Douglas and Olen Loyd were charged
with assault with intent to murder and given separate trials.21
Loyd’s trial was held first, and he was convicted.22 Before Loyd
was sentenced, the prosecutor called him to testify at Douglas’s
trial, but Loyd attempted to invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.23 The trial judge precluded
Loyd from invoking this privilege because he had already been
convicted, but Loyd persisted in refusing to testify.24 Then,
under the guise of attempting to refresh Loyd’s recollection, the
prosecutor read the entirety of a confession allegedly made by
Loyd, which in part named Douglas as the person who fired the
shot that struck the victim.25 Three law enforcement officers
thereafter identified the confession as one made and signed by
Loyd, but the confession was not officially offered into
evidence.26 Although Loyd’s confession was not technically
admitted into evidence, it is clear that the jury used it in
convicting Douglas.
The Supreme Court found that Douglas’s inability to
cross-examine Loyd regarding this “alleged confession plainly
denied him the right of cross-examination secured by the
Confrontation Clause.”27 According to the Court, while the
prosecutor’s “reading of Loyd’s alleged statement, and Loyd’s
refusal to answer, were not technically testimony, the
[prosecutor’s] reading may well have been the equivalent in the
jury’s mind of testimony that Loyd in fact made the
statement . . . .”28 Therefore, “Loyd’s reliance on privilege

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965).
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416-17.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 419.
Id.
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created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer
both that the statement had been made and that it was true.”29
The Court held that “effective confrontation of Loyd was
only possible if Loyd affirmed the statement as his” and that
Loyd instead invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and did
not expose himself to cross-examination.30
2. In Jury We Trust: Delli Paoli and the Efficacy of
Jury Instructions
A limiting instruction is a direction the judge gives to
the jury, instructing its members not to use certain evidence
for an improper purpose. Whether jurors actually do (or even
mentally can) abide by these limiting instructions is
fundamental to the rationale underlying the Bruton doctrine.
When the Supreme Court first addressed the issue, it placed a
great deal of trust in jurors’ ability to heed limiting
instructions. For instance, the 1957 case Delli Paoli v. United
States31 underscored the notion that jurors will follow a court’s
clear instructions.32 As the Court’s opinion in Delli Paoli makes
clear, courts historically applied this premise in cases where
judges instructed jurors in joint trials to use only nontestifying
codefendants’ confessions as evidence of their guilt—not as
evidence against other defendants.
In Delli Paoli, Orlando Delli Paoli was tried jointly with
four codefendants on charges of conspiracy to deal unlawfully
in alcohol.33 One of those codefendants, James Whitley, signed a
written confession after the conspiracy was over that also
implicated Delli Paoli.34 The district court admitted Whitley’s
confession but emphatically instructed the jury to use the
confession only in determining Whitley’s guilt and not the guilt
of the other defendants.35 The Court explained that the
confession was hearsay and therefore inadmissible against the
other defendants. However, since the confession was considered
an admission against Whitley’s penal interest (an exception to
the hearsay rule) the Court allowed the confession with the
instruction that the jury should use it against Whitley only,
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
Id.
352 U.S. 232 (1957).
See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
352 U.S. at 233.
Id.
Id.
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and not against Delli Paoli. In addressing this issue, the Court
first noted that if the facts were somewhat different, it would
have been clear that there was no evidentiary error.36 First, if
Whitley’s confession did not implicate Delli Paoli in the
conspiracy, its admission would not have been objectionable.37
Second, if the district court admitted the confession but deleted
all reference to Delli Paoli, it clearly would have been
admissible.38 Third, if Whitley’s statement were made in
furtherance of the subject conspiracy, it would have constituted
a coconspirator admission and been admissible against all
codefendants.39 As noted, though, Whitley made his confession
after the conspiracy was over, meaning that his confession was
“nothing more than hearsay evidence” and thus inadmissible
against his codefendants.40
The Court’s decision about whether to affirm Delli
Paoli’s conviction hinged on whether the jury followed the
district court’s limiting instruction and used Whitley’s
confession as evidence of only his guilt.41 The Court concluded
that it did. This was based not so much upon an actual belief
that the jurors did as they were told as it was upon the fear that
a contrary conclusion would mean that the very concept of trial
by jury would need to be abandoned. According to the Court,
It is a basic premise of our jury system that the court states the law to
the jury and that the jury applies that law to the facts as the jury finds
them. Unless we proceed on the basis that the jury will follow the
court’s instructions where those instructions are clear and the
circumstances are such that the jury can reasonably be expected to
follow them, the jury system makes little sense. Based on faith that
the jury will endeavor to follow the court’s instructions, our system of
jury trial has produced one of the most valuable and practical
mechanisms in human experience for dispensing substantial justice.42

While the Court acknowledged that there may be some
cases where such blind faith should not be placed in the jury’s
ability to respect limiting instructions, it found that the case before
it was not one of them and affirmed Delli Paoli’s conviction.43
36

Id. at 237.
Id.
38
Id. According to the Court, “The impracticality of such deletion was,
however, agreed to by both the trial court and the entire court below and cannot well
be controverted.” Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 240.
41
Id. at 241-43.
42
Id. at 242.
43
Id. at 243.
37
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter expressed
doubt that jurors had the ability to “put out of their minds”
evidence that they had already seen and heard. Jackson wrote,
“The Government should not have the windfall of having the
jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a
matter of law, they should not consider but which they cannot
put out of their minds.”44 Eleven years later, in the 1968 case
Bruton v. United States, the Court would agree with Justice
Frankfurter and lose trust in the jury’s ability to respect
limiting instructions.45
3. In Jury We Doubt: The Court’s Loss of Faith in the
Jury
In its 1964 opinion Jackson v. Denno, the Court relied in
part on Jackson’s Delli Paoli dissent in expressing its distrust
in jurors’ ability to disregard involuntary confessions.46 Jackson
considered the constitutionality of a New York rule under
which a defendant’s confession was given to jurors rather than
the judge to determine its voluntariness, with the judge
instructing jurors to disregard the confession entirely if they
determined that it was involuntary.47 In resolving this issue,
the Court posed the following questions:
Under the New York procedure, the fact of a defendant’s confession is
solidly implanted in the jury’s mind, for it has not only heard the
confession, but it has been instructed to consider and judge its
voluntariness and is in position to assess whether it is true or false. If
it finds the confession involuntary, does the jury—indeed, can it—then
disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions[?] If there
are lingering doubts about the sufficiency of the other evidence, does
the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the confession?
Will uncertainty about the sufficiency of the other evidence to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt actually result in acquittal when the
jury knows the defendant has given a truthful confession?48

The Court noted the folly of this venture, finding that
“[i]t is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession
which a jury has found to be involuntary has nevertheless
influenced the verdict or that its finding of voluntariness, if
this is the course it took, was affected by the other evidence
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 248 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Id. at 374.
Id. at 388.
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showing the confession was true.”49 For the Court, though, this
uncertainty was enough for it to conclude that New York’s rule
contravened the defendant’s rights under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the rule “pose[d]
substantial threats to a defendant’s constitutional rights to
have an involuntary confession entirely disregarded.”50
The Supreme Court in 1966 amended Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 14, which authorized courts to sever
defendants’ trials if consolidation appeared to prejudice the
government or the defendants.51 The amendment added a
clause to Rule 14, which provided that “[i]n ruling on a motion
by a defendant for severance the court may order the
government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any
statements or confessions made by the defendants which the
government intends to introduce in evidence at trial.”52 The
accompanying Advisory Committee’s Note elucidated the
amendment’s rationale: “A defendant may be prejudiced by the
admission in evidence against a codefendant of a statement or
confession made by that codefendant. This prejudice cannot be
dispelled by cross-examination if the codefendant does not take
the stand. Limiting instructions to the jury may not in fact
erase the prejudice.”53
Together, the above actions undermined the holding in
Delli Paoli—that courts can trust jurors to respect limiting
instructions when codefendant confessions are introduced at
joint jury trials. The Court would later expressly recognize this
notion in Bruton.
B.

The Bruton Doctrine

In 1968, Bruton v. United States decisively overruled Delli
Paoli, holding that the admission of certain codefendant
confessions at joint jury trials violates the Confrontation Clause.54
Several subsequent cases reveal that the Court does—and
should—construe the Bruton doctrine as a test of constitutional
harmfulness, not as a test of constitutional (un)reliability.
In Bruton, George William Bruton and William James
Evans were jointly tried on the federal charge of bank robbery,
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 389.
Id.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(b).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1966 Amendment).
391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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and Evans did not testify at trial.55 After he was arrested,
Evans gave a confession to a postal inspector in which he
refused to name his accomplice, but he also gave another
confession in which he admitted that Bruton and he committed
the armed robbery at issue.56 As in Delli Paoli, the district court
allowed the prosecution to introduce the latter confession and
issued a limiting instruction informing the jury, among other
things, that Evans’s confession was “hearsay insofar as the
defendant George William Bruton is concerned, and you are not
to consider it in any respect to the defendant Bruton, because
insofar as he is concerned it is hearsay.”57
Both Bruton and Evans were convicted, but their trial
was actually held one week after the United States Supreme
Court decided Miranda v. Arizona.58 On appeal, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Evans’s conviction upon
finding that his confessions were inadmissible under Miranda
because the interrogations that elicited the confessions were not
accompanied by the requisite preliminary warnings.59 But
because the district judge had instructed jurors not to use
Evans’s confessions as evidence of Bruton’s guilt, the Second
Circuit affirmed, assuming the jurors had heeded the instruction
and had not used the improper confession against Bruton.60
In analyzing the propriety of Bruton’s conviction, the
Supreme Court began by restating Delli Paoli’s basic premise:
“[I]t is reasonably possible for the jury to follow sufficiently clear
instructions to disregard the confessor’s extrajudicial statement
that his codefendant participated with him in committing the
crime.”61 The Court then reiterated that “[i]f it were true that the
jury disregarded the reference to the codefendant, no question
would arise under the Confrontation Clause, because by
hypothesis the case is treated as if the confessor made no
statement inculpating the nonconfessor.”62 Ultimately, however,
the Court found that it had effectively repudiated this basic
premise through the previously mentioned actions.63

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 125 n.2.
Id. at 124 n.1; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124.
Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 126 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)).
Id.
Id.
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First, the Court stated that in Douglas it relied upon
finding a Confrontation Clause violation when Loyd’s
confession was read to the jury even though it was not
technically admitted into evidence.64 The Court then noted that
Evans’s confession implicating Bruton actually was introduced
into evidence, which increased the likelihood that the jury
would improperly use the confession as evidence of Bruton’s
guilt.65 The Court thus found that Bruton’s inability to crossexamine Evans, like Douglas’s inability to cross-examine Loyd,
denied him his rights under the Confrontation Clause.66
The Court next noted that while Jackson did not involve
a codefendant’s confession, the Court relied in part upon
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Delli Paoli to reject the
proposition that a court can rely upon a jury to ignore a
defendant’s confession after being asked to determine whether
that confession was voluntary.67 The Court facilely agreed with
the opinion of the Supreme Court of California in People v.
Aranda, which had used Jackson to reject Delli Paoli’s premise
that a court can rely upon a jury to not use a codefendant’s
confession as evidence of the other defendant’s guilt.68 Indeed,
the Court quoted Aranda for the proposition that “‘[i]f it is a
denial of due process to rely on a jury’s presumed ability to
disregard an involuntary confession, it may also be a denial of
due process to rely on a jury’s presumed ability to disregard a
codefendant’s confession implicating another defendant when it
is determining that defendant’s guilt or innocence.’”69
Then, after describing the import of the aforementioned
amendment to Rule 14,70 the Court set forth and struck down
several defenses to the procedure approved in Delli Paoli. First,
the Court noted that Judge Learned Hand had argued that
while a limiting instruction might not prevent a jury from
using a codefendant’s confession as evidence of the other
defendant’s guilt, the admission of such a confession along with
a limiting instruction “‘probably furthers, rather than impedes,
the search for truth.’”71 The Court found that this argument
overlooked alternative ways of getting such a confession before
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 130.
Id. (quoting People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72 (Cal. 1965)).
Id. at 131-32.
Id. at 133 (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)).
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the jury without violating the nonconfessor’s right of
confrontation, such as admitting the confession after redacting
references to the nonconfessing codefendant.72
Second, the Court cited the argument that it should
maintain the rule of Delli Paoli because its abolishment would
lead prosecutors to pursue separate trials and sacrifice the
numerous benefits of joint trials.73 The Court again turned this
argument aside, relying upon the dissenting opinion of Justice
Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Fisher,
which concluded that it could not sacrifice a defendant’s
constitutional rights at the altar of greater convenience,
economy, and speed in the administration of justice.74
Third, the Court referenced its prior conclusion in Delli
Paoli—that a contrary result would have required abolishing
the very idea of trial by jury.75 The Court now regarded this
pronouncement as hyperbolic, finding “that in many . . . cases
the jury can and will follow the trial judge’s instructions to
disregard” inadmissible evidence brought to its attention.76 In
other cases, however, “as was recognized in Jackson v.
Denno . . . the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital
to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the
jury system cannot be ignored.”77 And according to the Court,
“Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who
stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately
spread before the jury in a joint trial.”78 In other words, when the
prosecution has presented an entire case against a
codefendant—including that codefendant’s confession, in which
he claims that the defendant and he committed the crime—it is
simply too much to ask the jury to disregard that confession as
evidence of the other defendant’s guilt.
The Court deemed such codefendant confessions
devastating to other defendants.79 Accordingly, it held that
“[d]espite the concededly clear instructions to the jury to
disregard Evans’s inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 133-34 & n.10.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 134-35 (quoting People v. Fisher, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (N.Y. 1928)).
Id. at 135.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 135-36.
Id. at 136.
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petitioner, in the context of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting
instructions as an adequate substitute for petitioner’s
constitutional right of cross-examination.”80 The Court
emphasized that it was the inadmissibility of Evans’s confession
combined with this likelihood of harmfulness that led to the
Confrontation Clause violation.81 The case did not present “any
recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as [Bruton] is
concerned and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions
necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause.”82
Courts later interpreted the Court’s opinion as creating
the “Bruton doctrine,” under which the admission at a joint
jury trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession that is
inadmissible against other defendants under the rules of
evidence violates the Confrontation Clause.83
C.

Harrington v. California and Harmless Error

In Harrington v. California, the Court was presented
with the question of whether violations of the Bruton doctrine
automatically require reversal or whether they are subject to
traditional harmless error analysis.84 In Harrington, three
African-American men and one Caucasian man, Glen
Harrington, were jointly tried before a jury on charges of
attempted robbery and first-degree murder.85 Two of the
African-American men gave confessions which also implicated
“the white guy” or “the white boy.”86 These two codefendants did
not testify at trial, but the prosecution did introduce their
confessions, which were inadmissible against Harrington under
the rules of evidence.87 The third African-American defendant
did testify and implicated Harrington, and Harrington also
testified and implicated himself.88 Moreover, other witnesses
testified that Harrington had a gun and was an active
participant in the attempted robbery.89
80

Id. at 137.
Id. at 128 n.3.
82
Id.
83
E.g., United States ex rel. Winsett v. Anderson, 456 F.2d 1197, 1198-99 (3d
Cir. 1972). Later in 1968, the Supreme Court found in Roberts v. Russell that this new
Bruton doctrine was applicable to state court prosecutions. 392 U.S. 293, 294 (1968).
84
395 U.S. 250, 252 (1969).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 253.
87
Id. at 252.
88
Id. at 253-54.
89
Id.
81
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Harrington was convicted, and the United States
Supreme Court ultimately held that the admission of
nontestifying codefendants’ confessions violated the Bruton
doctrine.90 That said, the Court found that this Confrontation
Clause violation was subject to harmless error review and
determined that the trial court’s error was harmless in light of
other overwhelming evidence of Harrington’s guilt.91
D.

Parker v. Randolph: The Court’s First Stab at
Interlocking Confessions

In Bruton, the Court found a Confrontation Clause
violation in part because Evans’s confession had a
“devastating” practical effect on Bruton’s defense.92 In its 1979
opinion in Parker v. Randolph, the Court unsuccessfully
attempted to answer the question of whether a codefendant’s
confession could survive Confrontation Clause scrutiny if the
prosecution could prove that its admission would not
“devastate” the defenses of other defendants in a given case.93
In Parker v. Randolph, several defendants were jointly tried
before a jury in connection with a murder committed during a
robbery, and none of the defendants testified.94 Each of the
defendants made a confession to police officers that interlocked
with the other defendants’ confessions—that is, they
corroborated the other confessions.95 The trial court allowed the
State to introduce each of these confessions and instructed
jurors to use each defendant’s confession solely as evidence of
his guilt because each confession was only admissible against
the confessor under the rules of evidence.96
In finding that the Sixth Circuit improperly granted
habeas relief to one of the defendants convicted after this joint
trial, the United States Supreme Court concluded in a four
Justice plurality opinion “that admission of interlocking
confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to the
requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.”97 According to the plurality, the
90
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admission of a codefendant’s interlocking confession does not
violate the Bruton doctrine because the other defendant has
himself confessed, which is “probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.”98
Therefore, admitting the codefendant’s interlocking confession
would not have the “devastating” practical effect forecast by the
Bruton Court, and the Bruton remedy of “cross-examination
would likely yield small advantage to the defendant whose own
admission of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged.”99
Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of the case
while three dissenting Justices would have found a Bruton
doctrine violation and reversed.100 Meanwhile, Justice Blackmun
concurred with the plurality, deeming the admission of the
interlocking confessions harmless error based upon the facts of
the case before him.101 Justice Blackmun, however, specifically
refused to join the plurality’s new interlocking confession
exception to Bruton, concluding that “it abandon[ed] the
harmless-error analysis” the Court announced in Harrington.102
Blackmun concluded that when the prosecution admits a
nontestifying codefendant’s confession that also implicates other
defendants, there is a violation of the Bruton doctrine, and the
question then becomes whether that violation constituted
harmless error.103 According to Justice Blackmun, the fact that the
codefendant’s confession interlocks with other defendants’
confessions is only relevant to the harmless error analysis—not
the baseline question of whether there was a Bruton
doctrine/Confrontation Clause violation.104 Eight years later, in
Cruz v. New York, a majority of the Court would agree with him.105
E.

Ohio v. Roberts and Adequate Indicia of Reliability

In the interim, in 1980, the Supreme Court in Ohio v.
Roberts finally articulated a test that addressed the issue of
whether the admission of hearsay violates the Confrontation

98

Id. at 72 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139 (1968)
(White, J., dissenting)).
99
Id. at 73.
100
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Clause because it is constitutionally unreliable,106 a test that it
would later refine in Crawford v. Washington.
According to the Court, its task in Roberts was to
determine “the relationship between the Confrontation Clause
and the hearsay rule with its many exceptions.”107 And
according to the Court, even if a declarant’s hearsay
statements are admissible against a defendant under an
exception to the rule against hearsay, they run afoul of the
Confrontation Clause if the declarant is not present for crossexamination at trial unless the State establishes two
elements.108 First, the State must establish that the declarant is
“unavailable.”109 Second, it must prove that the statement
“bears adequate indicia of reliability.”110 The Court concluded
that “[r]eliability can be inferred without more in a case where
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”111 If
a statement does not fall within such an exception, “the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”112
The Court concluded that when defense counsel tests
preliminary hearing testimony with cross-examination or the
equivalent of cross-examination, that testimony bears
sufficient indicia of reliability and affords the trier of fact a
basis for evaluating the truth of the testimony sufficient to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause.113
F.

Lee v. Illinois and Actual Harm

In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Lee v. Illinois,114 a case
that resembled Bruton in all regards but one: the trier of fact. In
Lee, Millie Lee and Edwin Thomas were charged with committing
a double murder after both signed written confessions.115 As in
Parker v. Randolph, these confessions interlocked, at least to a
certain degree: Thomas’s confession implicated Lee in the
murders.116 But unlike the Randolph defendants, Lee and Thomas
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
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were jointly tried before a judge, not a jury.117 Thomas did not
testify, the prosecutor introduced his confession, and the trial
judge expressly explained that he relied upon Thomas’s
confession in finding Lee guilty of both murders.118
Lee appealed thereafter and claimed that the trial court
improperly used Thomas’s confession as evidence of her guilt.
But the Appellate Court of Illinois disagreed and found no
Bruton doctrine problem because Thomas’s confession
interlocked with Lee’s.119 According to the Court, Lee did not
involve two issues. First, the Court proclaimed that Lee was
“not strictly speaking a Bruton case because [the Court was]
not . . . concerned with the effectiveness of limiting instructions
in preventing the spill-over prejudice to a defendant when his
codefendant’s confession is admitted against the codefendant at
a joint trial.”120 Instead, Lee involved a bench trial in which the
judge acknowledged that he used Thomas’s confession as
evidence of Lee’s guilt, meaning that “[t]he danger against
which the Confrontation Clause was erected . . . actually
occurred.”121 Second, the case did not involve the issue of
whether the trial court violated Illinois evidence law in using
Thomas’s confession as evidence of Lee’s guilt because that was
a matter of state law.122
Instead, the sole issue before the Court was whether
Thomas’s confession had adequate indicia of reliability under
Ohio v. Roberts such that it could be admitted directly against
Lee without violating the Confrontation Clause.123 While the
Court found that Thomas’s confession interlocked with Lee’s
confession to a certain extent, it ultimately concluded that
there were discrepancies between the two confessions that
were neither irrelevant nor trivial.124 Accordingly, the Court
found a Confrontation Clause violation because “when the
discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant, the
co-defendant’s confession may not be admitted.”125 Thus,
according to the Court, there simply were inadequate indicia of
reliability to allow for the admission of the statement.
117
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Richardson v. Marsh: The Redaction Solution

The Court again addressed a case resembling Bruton in
every regard but one in Richardson v. Marsh. In Richardson,
Clarissa Marsh, Benjamin Williams, and Kareem Martin were
charged with assault and murder.126 Marsh and Williams were
later given a joint jury trial, and Williams did not testify.127 The
prosecution, however, introduced Williams’s confession, in
which he implicated Marsh, Martin, and himself in the subject
crimes.128 The confession was carefully redacted to remove all
references to Marsh; these redactions “omit[ted] all indication
that anyone other than Martin and Williams participated in
the crime.”129 After admitting the redacted confession, the Court
admonished the jury “not to use it in any way against [Marsh]”
because the confession was inadmissible against Marsh under
the rules of evidence.130
The Court found that, unlike the confession in Bruton,
based upon the redaction, “in this case the confession was not
incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with
evidence introduced later at trial . . . .”131 This fact was
significant to the Court, which concluded that “[w]here the
necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid
generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction
to disregard the evidence.”132 According to the Court, while it
may not be simple for jurors to respect an instruction to use a
codefendant’s confession that does not facially incriminate
other defendants only as evidence of the codefendant’s guilt,
“there does not exist the overwhelming probability of their
inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton’s exception to
the general rule.”133
Finally, the Court noted that its decision was at least
partly based upon practicality. According to the Court, if the
Bruton doctrine only applies “to facially incriminating
confessions, Bruton can be complied with by redaction—a
possibility suggested in that opinion itself.”134 Conversely, if the
126
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128
129
130
131
132
133
134

481 U.S. 200, 202 (1987).
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 208-09.

2012]

AVOIDING A CONFRONTATION?

643

doctrine were extended to include “confessions incriminating by
connection, not only is that not possible, but it is not even
possible to predict the admissibility of a confession in advance
of trial.”135 Instead, trial judges would not be able to determine
whether such confessions were sufficiently incriminatory until
the close of the evidence, which, “even without manipulation
w[ould] result in numerous mistrials and appeals.”136
H.

Cruz v. New York: Interlocking Confessions, Take Two

In 1987, the Supreme Court finally answered—in the
affirmative—the question it had left unresolved eight years
earlier in Randolph137: Does the admission of interlocking
confessions violate the Bruton doctrine? In Cruz v. New York,
Eulogio and Benjamin Cruz were indicted for felony murder
and jointly tried before a jury.138 Before trial, Benjamin gave a
videotaped confession in which he admitted that Eulogio, two
other men, and he committed the crime charged.139 Benjamin
did not testify at trial, but the trial court, over Eulogio’s
objection, allowed the prosecution to introduce Benjamin’s
confession into evidence. The court then instructed the jury to
use Benjamin’s confession as evidence of his guilt only because
it was inadmissible against Eulogio under the rules of
evidence.140 After Eulogio was convicted, he appealed, and the
New York Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed, finding that
Eulogio gave a confession that “interlocked” with Benjamin’s
confession, rendering the Bruton doctrine inapplicable.141
A majority of the United States Supreme Court
disagreed, rejecting the plurality opinion in Parker v.
Randolph.142 As noted, the Randolph plurality would have
removed interlocking confessions from the purview of the
Bruton doctrine on the theory that a codefendant’s confession
cannot be devastating to the case of a defendant who has
himself confessed and devastated his own case.143 The Cruz
Court rejected this reasoning, finding that “[a] co-defendant’s
confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
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143
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it tells is different from that which the defendant himself is
alleged to have told, but enormously damaging if it confirms, in
all essential respects, the defendant’s alleged confession.”144
This finding led the Cruz Court to conclude, contrary to
the position of the Parker plurality, that interlocking
confessions are covered by the Bruton doctrine, which is merely
concerned with the harmfulness of codefendant confessions, not
their (un)reliability.145 According to the Court,
Quite obviously, what the “interlocking” nature of the codefendant’s
confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability:
If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant’s own
confession it is more likely to be true. Its reliability . . . may be
relevant to whether the confession should (despite the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination) be admitted as evidence against
the defendant, see Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 90
L.E.2d 514 (1986), but cannot conceivably be relevant to whether,
assuming it cannot be admitted, the jury is likely to obey the
instruction to disregard it, or the jury’s failure to obey is likely to be
inconsequential. The law cannot command respect if such an
inexplicable exception to a supposed constitutional imperative is
adopted. Having decided Bruton, we must face the honest
consequences of what it holds.146

And for the Court, the honest consequence was that the
case before it was “indistinguishable from Bruton with respect to
those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this area: the
likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded, . . . the
probability that such disregard will have a devastating
effect, . . . and the determinability of these factors in advance of
trial.”147
In other words, the Cruz Court “adopt[ed] the approach
espoused by Justice Blackmun” in his concurrence in Parker v.
Randolph.148 Under this approach, even interlocking confessions
are covered by the Bruton doctrine, and the only question is
whether the improper admission of such a confession is
harmless error.149 According to the Court, lower courts could use
the fact that the defendant made a confession that interlocked
with his codefendant’s confession in this harmless error
analysis.150 But the fact that the defendant gave an interlocking
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
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confession had no bearing on the issue of whether there was a
Bruton doctrine violation.151
I.

Gray v. Maryland: Obvious Omissions

The Supreme Court resolved its last major Bruton
doctrine case eleven years later in 1998, holding that
prosecutors cannot bypass the Bruton doctrine by blatantly
redacting codefendant confessions. In Gray v. Maryland,
Anthony Bell and Kevin Gray were jointly tried for the murder
of Stacey Williams.152 After Bell was arrested, a police detective
asked him, “Who was in the group that beat Stacey?” and he
responded that it was “he (Bell), Kevin Gray, and Jacquin
‘Tank’ Vanlandingham.”153 Bell did not testify at trial, but the
trial court allowed the detective to repeat his question and
restate Bell’s confession as “Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other
guys.”154 Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked the
detective whether it was true that Bell’s confession led the police
to be able to arrest Gray; the officer responded, “That’s
correct.”155 Finally, the trial court allowed the prosecution to
introduce a written copy of Bell’s confession with the names of
Gray and Vanlandingham “omitted, leaving in their place blank
white spaces separated by commas.”156 Later, the court instructed
the jury that Bell’s “confession was evidence only against Bell;
the instructions said that the jury should not use the confession
as evidence against Gray” because the confession was
inadmissible against Gray under the rules of evidence.157
After Gray was convicted, he appealed in the Maryland
state courts and ultimately filed a successful petition for writ of
certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. The Court
acknowledged that in Richardson v. Marsh, it held that the
admission of codefendant confessions redacted to remove any
reference to the existence of other defendants does not violate the
Bruton doctrine because they do not facially incriminate other
defendants.158 The Court, however, distinguished the redacted
confession before it from the redacted confession in Marsh:
151
152
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Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space
or a word such as “deleted” or a symbol or other similarly obvious
indications of alteration . . . leave statements that, considered as a
class, so closely resemble Bruton’s unredacted statements that, in
our view, the law must require the same result.159

The Court dismissed the argument that its ruling would
leave prosecutors with no alternative but to abandon the use of
codefendant confessions or joint trials, instead finding that
“[a]dditional redaction of a confession that uses a blank space,
the word ‘delete,’ or a symbol . . . normally is possible.”160 For
example, the Court wondered why Bell’s confession could not
have been altered to read, “Me and a few other guys.”161
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by three
other Justices.162 He took particular exception to the majority’s
suggestion that the detective could have testified that Bell
admitted that he “and a few other guys” beat Stacey.163 Scalia
was aware of no prior case in which the Court had endorsed
“the redaction of a statement by some means other than the
deletion of certain words, with the fact of the deletion shown.”164
According to Scalia, “[t]he risk to the integrity of our system
(not to mention the increase in its complexity) posed by the
approval of such freelance editing seems to me infinitely
greater than the risk posed by the entirely honest reproduction
that the Court disapproves.”165
J.

Constitutional Harmfulness, Not Constitutional
Reliability

These Supreme Court cases reveal that the Supreme
Court construes the Bruton doctrine as a test of constitutional
harmfulness, not as a test of constitutional (un)reliability. In
Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court laid out the constitutional
reliability test: if a statement lacks adequate indicia of
reliability, its admission violates the Confrontation Clause,
even if it qualifies for admission under an exception to the rule
against hearsay.166

159
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Conversely, according to the Court in Cruz, if a
nontestifying codefendant’s confession that facially incriminates
another defendant is inadmissible against that other defendant
under the rules of evidence, its admission at a joint jury trial
violates the Bruton doctrine and Confrontation Clause, regardless
of the statement’s reliability.167 Instead, the Bruton doctrine is a
test of constitutional harmfulness: if a codefendant’s confession is
sufficiently harmful or damaging to another defendant, it violates
the Bruton doctrine; if it is not sufficiently harmful or can be
made less harmful, it may be admitted.168
Thus, a codefendant’s confession that does not facially
incriminate another defendant is admissible despite the Bruton
doctrine not because it is any more reliable, but because it is less
harmful to the other defendant.169 Similarly, a codefendant’s
confession that redacts any reference to another defendant does
not violate the Bruton doctrine not because it is any more
reliable than that same confession before redaction, but because,
again, it is less harmful to the other defendant.170 On the other
hand, a redacted confession with the other defendant’s name
replaced with an obvious sign of redaction does violate the
Bruton doctrine; the other defendant is harmed substantially by
the admission of such an obviously redacted confession.171
II.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE CRAWFORD
REVOLUTION

A.

Crawford v. Washington and “Testimonial” Hearsay

In the 2004 case Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme
Court reconsidered and replaced the adequate indicia of
reliability test from Ohio v. Roberts. In Crawford, Michael
Crawford stabbed Kenneth Lee, who allegedly tried to rape
Michael’s wife, Sylvia.172 Officers arrived and Mirandized
Michael and Sylvia, who each gave tape-recorded statements.173
And while Sylvia’s account of the events leading up to the
stabbing generally corroborated her husband’s story, “her
account of the fight was arguably different—particularly with
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
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respect to whether Lee had drawn a weapon before [Michael]
assaulted him . . . [.]”174
At Michael’s trial for assault and attempted murder,
Sylvia did not testify pursuant to Washington’s spousal
testimonial privilege.175 Therefore, the State introduced Sylvia’s
tape-recorded statement over Michael’s objection as a
statement against penal interest (an exception to the rule
against hearsay).176 After he was convicted, Michael appealed,
claiming that the admission of Sylvia’s statement violated the
Confrontation Clause, and the Washington Court of Appeals
agreed with him.177 But the Supreme Court of Washington
found no Confrontation Clause violation: it concluded that
Sylvia’s statement bore guarantees of trustworthiness
sufficient to satisfy Ohio v. Roberts.178 Michael thereafter filed a
successful petition for writ of certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court, asserting that the Ohio v. Roberts test strayed
from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.179
The Court considered the historical background of the
Confrontation Clause to ascertain the validity of Crawford’s
claim and concluded that this history supported two
inferences.180 First, the Court found that “the principal evil at
which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law
mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused”181—that is,
examinations of accusers conducted before trial and without
the defendant present. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
Confrontation Clause covers live testimony in court as well as
ex parte testimony or “testimonial” statements.182
The Court articulated various formulations of
“testimonial statements,” defining them at one point as
“statements that were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”183 The
Court, however, neither chose one of these formulations nor
concluded that the Confrontation Clause was only concerned
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
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183
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with testimonial hearsay. Instead, it was enough for the Court
to conclude that “even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely
concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object,
and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely
within that class.”184 According to the Court, “[a]n accuser who
makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not.”185
The Court’s second inference was “that the Framers
would not have allowed the admission of testimonial statements
of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was
unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”186 The Court then explained
that the case law had largely been consistent with both of these
principles.187 According to the Court, with one arguable exception,
its cases remained faithful to the Framers’ understanding of the
Confrontation Clause: “Testimonial statements of witnesses
absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is
unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine.”188 In reaching this conclusion,
however, the Court noted that its prior opinions in Parker v.
Randolph and Cruz v. New York did not address the question of
whether testimonial hearsay by an unconfronted declarant
violated the Confrontation Clause but instead “addressed the
entirely different question whether a limiting instruction cured
prejudice to codefendants from admitting a defendant’s own
confession against him in a joint trial.”189
Conversely, the Court concluded that the Ohio v.
Roberts test departed from the Framers’ understanding in ways
that both helped and hurt criminal defendants. First, the test
was too broad because it required the exclusion of even
nontestimonial hearsay if a prosecutor could not prove that the
hearsay had adequate indicia of reliability.190 Second, the test
was too narrow because it allowed for the admission of even
testimonial hearsay as long as a prosecutor could prove that it
was sufficiently reliable.191 In these ways, the Roberts test
184
185
186
187
188
189
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“replace[d] the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing
reliability with a wholly foreign one.”192 This rendered the
Roberts test “very different from exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a surrogate
means of assessing reliability.”193 As a counterpoint, the Court
referenced and accepted the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing, which “extinguishes confrontation claims on
essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to be an
alternative means of determining reliability.”194
Moreover, the Court deemed the adequate indicia of
reliability test to be “so unpredictable that it fail[ed] to provide
meaningful protection from even core confrontation
violations.”195 The Court, though, deemed this unpredictability a
forgivable sin compared with “[t]he unpardonable vice of the
Roberts test”: “its demonstrated capacity to admit core
testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly
meant to exclude.”196
The Court thus replaced the adequate indicia of
reliability test with the following test: “Where testimonial
evidence is at issue, . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what
the common law required: unavailability and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.”197 Or, put simply, “[w]here
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the
one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”198
Finding that Sylvia’s statement to the police officers was
testimonial and that Michael had no opportunity to crossexamine her, the Supreme Court thus concluded that a
Confrontation Clause violation existed.199
But does the Confrontation Clause only cover
testimonial hearsay? The Court would answer that question in
the affirmative a few years later.

192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 68.
Id.
Id.

2012]

B.

AVOIDING A CONFRONTATION?

651

Davis, Bockting and the Testimonial/Nontestimonial
Dichotomy

In 2006, the Court resolved the companion cases of
Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana. In Davis,
Michelle McCottry made statements to a 911 operator
identifying Adrian Davis as her assailant, just after he had
assaulted her.200 In Hammon, police responded to the site of a
“reported domestic disturbance at the house of Amy and
Hershel Hammon.”201 Amy initially told officers that “nothing
was the matter,” but while an officer was with Hershel in the
kitchen, Amy filled out and signed a battery affidavit in the
living room with the other officer.202
McCottry did not testify at Davis’s trial, and Amy
Hammon did not testify at her husband’s trial, but their
statements were each admitted under exceptions to the rule
against hearsay.203 Deciding whether the admission of either
statement violated the Confrontation Clause, the Davis Court
answered two questions left unresolved by Crawford: (1) whether
the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay and
(2) which police interrogations produce testimonial hearsay.204
The Court answered the first question in the
affirmative, concluding that “[i]t is the testimonial character of
the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while
subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not
subject to the Confrontation Clause.”205 In response to the
second question, the Court created a dichotomy to resolve the
cases before it:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.206

Using this test, the Court deemed Michelle McCottry’s
statements nontestimonial and properly admitted but
200
201
202
203
204
205
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concluded that Amy Hammon’s statements were testimonial.207
The Court acknowledged that Hammon’s statements, despite
being testimonial, could still be admitted against her husband
if he procured or coerced silence from her because “one who
obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the
constitutional right to confrontation.”208 According to the Court,
this rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing still survived because
“Crawford, in overruling Roberts, did not destroy the ability of
courts to protect the integrity of their proceedings.”209 But in the
absence of such forfeiture, the admission of her statements
violated the Confrontation Clause.210
Later, in Whorton v. Bockting, the Supreme Court
reiterated that “[u]nder Crawford, . . . . the Confrontation
Clause has no application to [nontestimonial] statements and
therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of
reliability.”211 In its 2011 opinion in Michigan v. Bryant,
however, a majority of the Court noted that to conduct the
primary purpose analysis of Davis, “standard rules of hearsay,
designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be
relevant.”212 This led some,213 including Justice Scalia in his
dissenting opinion, to conclude that the majority was
resurrecting the Roberts adequate indicia of reliability test
without explicitly overruling Crawford.214
III.

LOWER COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF BRUTON

Lower court interpretations of the Bruton doctrine
corroborate the claim that the doctrine is a test of
constitutional harmfulness and not a test of constitutional
reliability. This section breaks down the way that lower courts
have handled the Bruton doctrine, before and after Crawford,
to reveal that Crawford did not transform the Bruton doctrine
into a test of constitutional reliability concerned with whether
codefendant statements are testimonial or nontestimonial.
207
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Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
213
See, e.g., Colin Miller, Michigan v. Bryant, Part 6, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG
(Mar. 3, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2011/03/yesterday-i-postedan-entryaboutjustice-scalia-accusing-the-majority-in-michigan-v-bryantofretreatingfromcrawford-v-washi.html.
214
131 S. Ct. at 1168-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Instead, these cases reveal that the testimonial/nontestimonial
dichotomy is entirely separate from the Bruton doctrine.
A.

The Inapplicability of the Bruton Doctrine at Bench
Trials
1. Pre-Crawford Precedent

In the wake of the Court’s opinion in Lee v. Illinois,
several courts grappled with the question of whether the
Bruton doctrine applies to bench trials or whether it applies
only to jury trials. Every federal appellate court that addressed
the issue before Crawford concluded the doctrine was
inapplicable to cases heard by judges rather than juries.215
For example, in Rogers v. McMackin, Darrick Rogers,
Mimi Cash, Ricardo Forney, and Andre Robinson were
allegedly coparticipants in a restaurant robbery and the fatal
shooting of its proprietor.216 Rogers confessed to the crime, and
Robinson also gave a confession that largely interlocked with
Rogers’s confession.217 The two were given a joint bench trial,
and the prosecution introduced Robinson’s confession despite
the fact that he did not testify at trial.218 After Rogers was
convicted and exhausted his state court remedies, he brought a
habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio, claiming that the admission
of Robinson’s confession violated the Bruton doctrine.219
The district court agreed with Rogers, finding that Lee
made the Bruton doctrine applicable to bench trials.220 With this
“understanding of Lee, the district court looked for the
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ required by Ohio
v. Roberts . . . ; finding none, the court concluded that the
admission of Robinson’s confession constituted prejudicial error
of constitutional dimension.”221
The Sixth Circuit disagreed, noting that the Court
explicitly found that Lee was “‘not strictly speaking a Bruton
case’” because it did not concern the effectiveness of limiting
215

See, e.g., United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1155 (5th Cir. 1993) (joining
several other circuits in finding that the Bruton doctrine is inapplicable to bench trials).
216
884 F.2d 252, 253 (6th Cir. 1989).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 254.
219
Id.
220
Id. at 257.
221
Id.
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instructions to the jury.222 Indeed, “[t]he Lee Court did not even
consider whether the co-defendant’s confession was so
‘devastating’ as to prevent its proper use.”223 Moreover, the
Sixth Circuit pointed out that “although Lee, like Parker v.
Randolph, . . . was a case of interlocking confessions, the Lee
Court focused not on whether their interlocking nature made
them ‘devastating,’ but on whether their interlocking nature
made them reliable.”224 Finally, the court then refused to make
this extension itself, finding that there was no reason to
conclude that judges, like jurors, are “incapable of separating
evidence properly admitted against one defendant from
evidence admitted against another.”225
2. Post-Crawford Precedent
In the wake of the Court’s opinion in Crawford and its
progeny, courts categorically continue to conclude that the
Bruton doctrine does not apply to joint bench trials, even if the
codefendant’s confession is testimonial, implying that the
testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy does not apply to the
Bruton doctrine. For instance, in West v. Jones, the court found
the Bruton doctrine inapplicable to bench trials because “[t]rial
courts are presumed to consider only properly admitted and
relevant evidence in rendering its decision and to give no
weight to improper testimonial evidence, which is taken under
objection.”226
Later finding that the Bruton doctrine was inapplicable
to bench trials, the Third Circuit noted that it was “agree[ing]
with every United States Court of Appeals that has considered
the question.”227

222

Id.
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.
226
No. 04-CV-40199-FL, 2006 WL 508652, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2006). As
in Lee, however, the court found that there was evidence that the trial judge relied on
Coleman’s confession to find West guilty. Id. at *4. Because this meant that the trial
judge in effect allowed for the admission of Coleman’s testimonial confession as
evidence against West, the Court found a Confrontation Clause violation, but not under
the Bruton doctrine. Id. at *3-4. Finding this violation to be harmless error, the court
denied West’s petition. Id. at *7.
227
Johnson v. Tennis, 549 F.3d 296, 298 (3d Cir. 2008).
223
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The Bruton Doctrine and the Neutral Pronoun Solution
1. Pre-Crawford Precedent

As noted, the Richardson v. Marsh Court found that the
redaction of a defendant’s confession to remove all references to
codefendants satisfied the Bruton doctrine and the
Confrontation Clause.228 Later, in Gray v. Maryland, the Court
found that redactions of codefendant confessions that simply
replace names with obvious blank spaces, words such as
“deleted,” symbols, or other similarly obvious indications of
alteration do violate the Bruton doctrine and the Confrontation
Clause.229 In Marsh, the Court left open the question of whether
defendant confessions can be redacted to replace the names of
other codefendants with neutral pronouns consistent with the
Confrontation Clause.230 In Gray, the Court did not explicitly
approve of this practice, but it did strongly imply that it found
this practice permissible. As noted, the Gray Court found that
a codefendant’s confession that “[Me], Kevin Gray, and Jacquin
‘Tank’ Vanlandingham” were in the group that beat up the
victim could not be redacted to read, “Me, deleted, deleted, and
a few other guys.”231 Later, however, the majority wondered why
the codefendant’s confession could not have been altered to
read, “Me and a few other guys.”232
Before Crawford, courts consistently concluded that the
Bruton doctrine does not apply when codefendant confessions
are redacted to replace other defendants’ names with neutral
pronouns.233 For instance, in United States v. Logan, after a
joint jury trial, Benjamin Logan was convicted of several
crimes, including robbery.234 Logan’s codefendant, Zachary
Roan, confessed to a detective that he planned and committed
the robbery with Logan.235 At their joint trial, Roan did not
testify, so the prosecution called the detective who testified
228

See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
230
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 n.5 (1987) (“We express no opinion
on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant’s name has been replaced
with a symbol or neutral pronoun.”).
231
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
232
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
233
See, e.g., United States v. Winston, 55 F. App’x 289, 294 (6th Cir. 2003)
(noting that “several of our sister circuits have noted that a Bruton violation can be
avoided by replacing the co-defendant’s name with a neutral pronoun or other
generalized phrase”).
234
210 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2000).
235
Id.
229
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that Roan confessed that he planned and committed the subject
robbery with “another individual.”236
In finding that the admission of Roan’s redacted
confession complied with the Bruton doctrine and the
Confrontation Clause, the Eighth Circuit noted in 2000 that
the Marsh Court left open the question of whether courts could
replace the names of other defendants with neutral pronouns.237
That said, the court found that “the principles on which Marsh
was decided provide[d] clear guidance on how to resolve the
instant difficulty.”238 According to the Eighth Circuit, Marsh
held that the Bruton doctrine only precludes the admission of
codefendant confessions that facially incriminate other
defendants, and confessions redacted to replace other
defendants’ names with neutral pronouns do not facially
incriminate other defendants.239 To reach this conclusion, the
court found that it was “simply adher[ing] to a view that
several of our cases have long since adopted.”240
2. Post-Crawford Precedent
After Crawford and its progeny, courts categorically
continue to conclude that the admission of a codefendant
confession redacted to replace the names of other defendants
with neutral pronouns does not violate the Bruton doctrine. For
instance, in United States v. Akefe, Aderemi J. Akefe and NaHeem Tokumbo Alade were charged with conspiracy to import
heroin into the United States and conspiracy to distribute
heroin.241 The two were given a joint jury trial, and Alade did
not testify.242 At trial, the prosecution called Special Agent
Michael Galu to testify. Galu conducted Alade’s post-arrest
interview, and the prosecutor engaged him in the following
colloquy during trial:
Q. Other than this post-arrest interview, did Mr. Alade make any
other statements to you?
A. He did.
Q. When did he make those statements?
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id.
No. 09 CR 196(RPP), 2010 WL 2899805, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2010).
Id.
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A. When, later that evening, I had transported Mr. Alade to the
Wayne County jail and as I was escorting Mr. Alade from my vehicle
to the jail processing center, he stated that, he said, oh man, I didn’t
know you guys got him too, man, I can help you out, I can help you
out.
Q. Who was he referring to?
A. Another person arrested in this case.243

Alade in fact had referred to Akefe, and the trial court
permitted Galu to answer this last question with the neutral
pronoun “another person” rather than with Akefe’s name to
prevent a Bruton doctrine violation.244 After this testimony by
Galu, the court instructed jurors only to use Alade’s statement
as evidence of his guilt and not as evidence of Akefe’s guilt.245
After he was convicted, Akefe appealed, claiming that
Alade’s statements to Galu were “testimonial” and thus
inadmissible under Crawford.246 The court disagreed, finding
that Alade’s reliance on Crawford “in attacking the
Government’s use of Alade’s Brutonized statement [wa]s
misplaced because Crawford held that testimonial hearsay
offered against a criminal defendant is unconstitutional under
the confrontation clause and therefore inadmissible.”247
According to the court, Crawford was irrelevant because “the
challenged testimony was offered only against Alade and the
jury was instructed accordingly.”248 The court thus concluded
that “Crawford is inapplicable and Alade’s Brutonized postarrest statement admitted solely against Alade is only violative
of Akefe’s confrontation clause rights if it violates the rules set
out in Bruton v. United States, . . . Richardson v.
Marsh, . . . and their progeny.”249
The court then failed to find such a violation, initially
noting that “[t]he Second Circuit has been clear that
statements made by defendants are admissible against the
speaker where the statement is redacted to replace the names
of co-defendants with neutral pronouns and the statement on
its face does not connect co-defendants to the crimes.”250 The
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

Id. at *25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court then asserted that Alade’s statement fell “squarely
within Second Circuit precedent because Akefe’s name was
replaced with a neutral pronoun, and the statement, standing
alone, did not implicate Akefe.”251 The Second Circuit is not
alone in this regard. Instead, as the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia noted in its 2011 opinion
United States v. Clarke, “[t]he use of neutral pronouns or other
general identifiers, such as ‘other guys,’ has been recognized by
several circuits as a type of redaction that satisfies Bruton.”252
C.

The Bruton Doctrine and Noncustodial/Nontestimonial
Hearsay
1. Pre-Crawford Precedent

Before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Crawford, the
vast majority of courts held that codefendants’ statements that
were noncustodial (and would now be considered
nontestimonial) were covered by the Bruton doctrine. For
instance, in State v. Swafford, Artis Swafford, Jan Anthony,
and Joel Butler were jointly tried before a jury on charges of
felony murder and aggravated robbery.253 Previously, Anthony
unwittingly made statements to confidential informant Lamar
Williams that also implicated Swafford and Butler.254 At trial,
Anthony did not testify, and the prosecution introduced a typed
transcript of these statements, with the names “Swafford” and
“Butler” deleted, “but blank spaces with underlining were
left.”255 After he was convicted, Swafford appealed, claiming
that the admission of the transcript violated the Bruton
doctrine.256 The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed, concluding
that “[w]hile the conversation between Lamar Williams and
Anthony is not a typical post-arrest confession, Bruton applies
to any extrajudicial statement by a nontestifying
codefendant.”257 Moreover, the court found that “Bruton applies
to a statement made in a noncustodial setting as well to a
statement made to other coconspirators if, as in this case, such
251

Id. at *26. According to the court, “[t]here was no evidence that the two
defendants on trial were the only individuals arrested in the investigation.” Id.
252
767 F. Supp. 2d 12, 31 (D.D.C. 2011).
253
913 P.2d 196, 198 (Kan. 1996).
254
Id. at 200.
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statement is not made during the life of, and in furtherance of,
the conspiracy.”258 Courts also consistently found that the
Bruton doctrine was violated by the admission of similar
noncustodial statements made to mothers,259 brothers,260
lovers,261 and other friends and family members.262
There were a few opinions before Crawford which held
that noncustodial statements were beyond the scope of the
Bruton doctrine, but these were the exceptions to the rule and
often based upon mistaken reasoning more than anything else.
For instance, in Brown v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia
found that the admission of a codefendant’s noncustodial
statements that qualified as coconspirator admissions did not
violate the Bruton doctrine.263 This was not a controversial
conclusion, as the Court in Delli Paoli pointed out that the
introduction of coconspirator admission presents no problems
under the Confrontation Clause.264 Later, however, Georgia
courts began citing Brown and its progeny to support the
proposition that noncustodial statements made after the
completion of conspiracies were beyond the scope of the Bruton
doctrine. These opinions read more as mistaken interpretations
of prior precedent rather than the courts consciously limiting
the scope of the Bruton doctrine.265
258

Id.
See, e.g., People v. Jimenez, No. C038273, 2002 WL 1486571, at *1-3 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 11, 2002) (finding a violation of the Bruton doctrine—but harmless
error—based upon the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s incriminatory
statement to his mother).
260
See, e.g., United States v. Ruff, 717 F.2d 855, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding
a violation of the Bruton doctrine—but harmless error—based upon the admission of a
nontestifying codefendant’s incriminatory statements to several family members,
including statements to his brother and brother-in law).
261
See, e.g., Holland v. Att’y Gen., 777 F.2d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding a
violation of the Bruton doctrine based upon the admission of a nontestifying
codefendant’s incriminatory statement to his wife).
262
See, e.g., Vincent v. Parke, 942 F.2d 989, 991-92 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding a
violation of the Bruton doctrine based upon the admission of a nontestifying
codefendant’s incriminatory statement to his sister); Monachelli v. Warden, SCI
Graterford, 884 F.2d 749, 753 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting “that the Bruton rule is applicable
where the statements of the non-testifying co-defendant were made in a non-custodial
setting to family and friends”).
263
416 S.E.2d 508, 509-10 (Ga. 1992).
264
See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 237 (1957).
265
For instance, in Johnson v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that
a codefendant’s noncustodial statement made after the completion of the charged
conspiracy was beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine. 571 S.E.2d 782, 784 (Ga.
2002). In reaching this conclusion, the court simply cited its prior opinion in Reid v.
State, 437 S.E.2d 646 (Ga. 1993) for the proposition that “Bruton is not applicable to a
statement which ‘is not the custodial confession of a non-testifying accomplice which
details the criminal participation of’ a co-defendant.” Id. (quoting Reid, 437 S.E.2d
646). In Reid, however, the court had found that a codefendant confession did not
259
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2. Post-Crawford Precedent
After Crawford, the tables have largely turned, with the
vast majority of courts finding that codefendants statements
that are nontestimonial (and would have been considered
noncustodial) are beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine. Many
of these opinions concluding that nontestimonial hearsay is
beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine were handed down in
2010, such as the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Dale,266 which was issued on July 30, 2010. In Dale, police found
the bodies of Anthony Rios and Olivia Raya as well as several
bricks of marijuana and cocaine at the couple’s Kansas City
home.267 During their investigation of these murders, law
enforcement officials convinced inmate Anthony Smith to wear a
wire and talk with Michael Dale, a suspect in the murders and
an inmate at the same facility as Smith.268 Smith eventually
recorded a conversation with Dale in which Dale incriminated
Dyshawn Johnson and himself in the murders.269 Dale and
Johnson were later jointly tried before a jury on charges of firstdegree murder and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, and Dale
did not testify at trial.270 At trial, the prosecution played the
recording of Dale’s confession to jurors and instructed them that
the tape-recorded conversation was not admissible against
Johnson.271
After he was convicted, Johnson appealed, claiming that
the admission of Dale’s statements violated the Bruton
doctrine.272 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that Dale’s
statements were nontestimonial and that after Davis v.
Washington and Whorton v. Bockting, “[i]t is now clear that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to non-testimonial
statements by an out-of-court declarant.”273 Therefore, the court
concluded that under its “present understanding of the
confrontation right, governed by Crawford, the introduction of

violate the Bruton doctrine not simply because it was noncustodial but because it “was
admissible against all defendants as the statement of a co-conspirator made prior to
the termination of the conspiracy.” 437 S.E.2d at 650.
266
614 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
267
Id. at 948.
268
Id. at 949.
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Dale’s out of court statements did not violate Johnson’s
confrontation right.”274
Nine days before Dale, on July 21, 2010, the Sixth Circuit
found that a codefendant’s statement to a confidential informant
that implicated another defendant could not violate the Bruton
doctrine because it was nontestimonial.275 Two weeks before Dale,
the First Circuit found that a codefendant’s similar statement to
his mother also was beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine
because it was nontestimonial.276 And, two months before Dale,
the Tenth Circuit concluded in United States v. Smalls that a
codefendant’s statements to a confidential informant were
properly admitted at a joint jury trial because “the Bruton rule,
like the Confrontation Clause upon which it is premised, does not
apply to nontestimonial hearsay statements.”277 Finally, in 2008,
the Second Circuit applied the same reasoning to a codefendant’s
confession to a fellow inmate.278
To this point, the only federal circuit court to find that
nontestimonial codefendant statements can violate the Bruton
doctrine after Crawford is the Third Circuit.279 Similarly, most
federal district courts have found after Crawford that
nontestimonial hearsay is beyond the scope of the Bruton
doctrine, but a couple of federal district courts have reached
contrary conclusions.280
V.

THE BRUTON DOCTRINE SHOULD STILL COVER
NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY

This section asserts that there are two possible
interpretations of the scope of the Bruton doctrine in the wake
of Crawford and its progeny—and that each should preclude
274

Id. at 956.
United States v. Sutton, 387 F. App’x 595, 602-03 (6th Cir. 2010).
276
United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2010).
277
605 F.3d 765, 768 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010).
278
See United States v. Pike, 292 F. App’x 108, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding
that a codefendant’s incriminatory statement to a fellow inmate could not violate the
Bruton doctrine because it was nontestimonial).
279
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 381 F. App’x 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We
have interpreted Bruton’s rule broadly, applying it not only to custodial confessions but
also to informal statements such as Gwen’s.”).
280
Compare United States v. Koning, No. 4:09CR3031, 2010 WL 3984739, at
*6 (D. Neb. Sept. 10, 2010) (“However, Bruton in not applicable to the McWha
documents. As very recently explained by the Eighth Circuit, ‘[t]he Confrontation
Clause does not apply to non-testimonial statements by an out-of-court declarant.’”),
with United States v. Williams, No. 1:09cr414 (JCC), 2010 WL 3909480, at *4 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 23, 2010) (finding that “Bruton can apply to non-confessional statements”).
275
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the admission of nontestimonial codefendant confessions. The
first is that Crawford, like its predeceesor, had nothing to say
about the inadmissibility of codefendant confessions under the
Bruton doctrine, meaning that courts should find that even
nontestimonial codefendant statements can violate the
doctrine. The second is that Crawford deconstitutionalized the
Bruton doctrine, meaning that nontestimonial codefendant
statements do not violate the Confrontation Clause. In this
case, however, courts should readily find that such
nontestimonial codefendant statements violate Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 and are therefore inadmissible anyway.
A.

Crawford’s Testimonial/Nontestimonial Dichotomy
Should Have Had No Effect on the Bruton Doctrine

The first interpretation of Crawford v. Washington and
its progeny is that they should have no effect on Bruton
doctrine cases. If this interpretation is correct, the question of
whether hearsay is “testimonial” or “nontestimonial” is
irrelevant to the Bruton doctrine, and the vast majority of
courts have erred in finding nontestimonial hearsay beyond
Bruton’s scope. There are several reasons to believe that
Crawford is as irrelevant as its predecessor—Ohio v. Roberts—
to the Bruton doctrine.281
The first reason is that the Bruton opinion itself dealt
with the inadmissibility of Evans’s confession under the rules
of evidence, not its constitutional (un)reliability. When the
Supreme Court decided Bruton in 1968, the Court had not yet
addressed the question of when the prosecution’s introduction
of hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause because it is
constitutionally unreliable. The Court did not address this
question until its 1970 opinion in California v. Green,282 and it
did not clearly resolve it until its 1980 opinion in Ohio v.
Roberts.283 The question for the Bruton Court thus was not
whether Evans’s confession was constitutionally unreliable.
Rather, the Court found that the confession “was clearly

281

See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
399 U.S. 149 (1970); see Anthony Bocchino & David Sonenshein, Rule
804(b)(6)—The Illegitimate Child of the Failed Liaison Between the Hearsay Rule and
Confrontation Clause, 73 MO. L. REV. 41, 56 (2008) (noting that Green was the Court’s
“first opinion explicitly addressing the interplay of the Confrontation Clause and the
law of hearsay”).
283
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
282
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inadmissible against him under traditional rules of evidence.”284
Evans’s confession was inadmissible against Bruton, and the
prosecution’s introduction of the confession violated the
Confrontation Clause because Evans did not testify and the
confession was sufficiently harmful to Evans.285 The Bruton
Court simply could not trust the jury to use Evans’s confession
solely as evidence of his guilt; the confession’s admission had a
devastating practical effect on Bruton’s defense.286
Indeed, the Court later recognized that because Evans’s
confession was inadmissible against Bruton, it did not need to
resolve the issue of whether the confession was constitutionally
unreliable. According to the Court, “[t]here is not before
us . . . any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as
[Bruton] is concerned and we intimate no view whatever that
such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the
Confrontation Clause.”287 This question of whether hearsay
violates the Confrontation Clause because it is constitutionally
unreliable was the question later resolved by the Court in
Roberts and Crawford, and, as the Bruton Court made clear, it
is a question unrelated to the doctrine it was creating.288
Second, Crawford along with its pronounced testimonalnontestimonial dichotomy is also irrelevant to the Bruton
doctrine because Cruz made clear that the Roberts test of
constitutional (un)reliability had no effect on the Bruton
doctrine. As noted, in Cruz, it was evident that Benjamin
Cruz’s confession was inadmissible against Eulogio Cruz at
their joint jury trial under the rules of evidence.289 But,
according to the State, because Eulogio Cruz gave an
interlocking confession, Benjamin Cruz’s confession had
adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy the Roberts test, which
would mean no Confrontation Clause problem.290 The Court
forcefully rejected this argument, finding that Roberts declared
that certain hearsay that is admissible under an exception to
the rule against hearsay nonetheless violates the Confrontation
Clause because it is constitutionally unreliable.291 Conversely,
the Bruton doctrine declares that certain hearsay that is
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 128 n.3 (1968).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
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inadmissible under the rules of evidence violates the
Confrontation Clause at joint jury trials because it is harmful.292
Thus, it was irrelevant to the Cruz Court that Eulogio
gave an interlocking confession:
Quite obviously, what the “interlocking” nature of the codefendant’s
confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability:
If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant’s own
confession it is more likely to be true. Its reliability . . . may be
relevant to whether the confession should (despite the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination) be admitted as evidence against
the defendant . . . but cannot conceivably be relevant to whether,
assuming it cannot be admitted, the jury is likely to obey the
instruction to disregard it, or the jury’s failure to obey is likely to be
inconsequential.293

The Cruz Court’s holding is unmistakable: The
admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying codefendant’s
confession that facially incriminates other defendants—but is
inadmissible against them under the rules of evidence—
violates the Bruton doctrine and the Confrontation Clause.294
The fact that such a confession was potentially “reliable” under
Roberts was irrelevant to the Bruton doctrine if the confession
was inadmissible against other defendants under the rules of
evidence.295 Indeed, the Cruz Court noted that reliable
confessions are often more harmful than unreliable confessions,
implying that constitutionally reliable confessions under
Roberts can be more violative of the Bruton doctrine than
constitutionally unreliable confessions.296
In fact, the Cruz Court came close to chastising the
State for arguing that inadmissible but constitutionally reliable
hearsay satisfied the Bruton doctrine, concluding that “[t]he
law cannot command respect if such an inexplicable exception
to a supposed constitutional imperative is adopted. Having
292

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1987).
294
See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
295
See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text. In its later opinion in
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]o be
admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a
defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness,
not by reference to other evidence at trial.” 497 U.S. at 822. If the Court had applied
this analysis in Cruz, it would not have found Benjamin Cruz’s confession reliable
based upon the mere fact that Eulogio Cruz gave an interlocking confession. The whole
point of Cruz, though, is that the Court did not need to resolve the issue of whether
Benjamin’s confession was reliable because reliability was irrelevant to its decision. See
supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
296
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
293
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decided Bruton, we must face the honest consequences of what
it holds.”297 And, as noted, for the Cruz Court, the honest
consequence was that the case before it was “indistinguishable
from Bruton with respect to those factors the Court has deemed
relevant in this area: the likelihood that the instruction will be
disregarded, . . . the probability that such disregard will have a
devastating effect, . . . and the determinability of these factors
in advance of trial.”298
The third reason why Crawford can be read as having
no effect on Bruton doctrine cases is that the Crawford opinion
itself implies that the Court did not intend for its
testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy to have any effect on the
Bruton doctrine. Crawford claimed that the Roberts “test
stray[ed] from the original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause and urge[d the Court] to reconsider it.”299 The Crawford
Court thus found that “[w]here testimonial statements are at
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.”300 The Court later confirmed in both
Davis and Bockting that Crawford overruled Roberts.301
If all the Court did in Crawford was overrule Roberts, it
is clear that the Court’s opinion had no effect on the Bruton
doctrine because the Roberts test for constitutional reliability
had no effect on the Bruton doctrine,302 which is solely
concerned with constitutional harmfulness, so there is no
reason to believe that Crawford’s replacement test for
constitutional reliability should be any different. Indeed, the
Crawford Court acknowledged that it was not affirmatively
reaching the conclusion that the Sixth Amendment is only
concerned with testimonial hearsay,303 so it would be difficult to
argue that Crawford itself found nontestimonial hearsay
beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine.
That said, the Crawford Court did conduct a historical
analysis of the Confrontation Clause, finding that it supported
two inferences: the clause (1) covers both live testimony in
court and “testimonial” statements and (2) does not allow for
the admission of “testimonial” statements unless the declarant
297
298
299
300
301
302
303

Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193.
Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
Id. at 68-69.
See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.J.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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is “unavailable” at trial and the defendant previously had the
chance to cross-examine him.304 The Court then found that its
“case law ha[d] been largely consistent with these two
principles.”305 The Court in Davis later used this historical
analysis to conclude that the Confrontation Clause is only
concerned with testimonial hearsay.306 The argument could be
made, then, that regardless of the actual grounds of its prior
Confrontation Clause precedent, going forward, only
testimonial hearsay can violate the Confrontation Clause.
There are, however, two separate portions of Crawford
that contradict the reading that the testimonial/nontestimonial
dichotomy applies to, and hence limits, the Bruton doctrine.
First, in its historical analysis, Crawford addressed an
important argument by the State. The State had argued that
the admission of Sylvia Crawford’s statement to the police did
not violate the Confrontation Clause despite the fact that she
refused to testify because her statement interlocked with
Michael Crawford’s own statement.307 The State began by
noting that “[i]n Parker v. Randolph, a plurality of this Court
determined that the ‘interlocking confessions’ of jointly tried codefendants were sufficiently reliable to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause.”308 The State did acknowledge that this
opinion was later “[a]brogated by Cruz v. New York.”309
This, however, still left the State with the Court’s
opinion in Lee v. Illinois, which the Court later noted was the
only decision arguably in tension with established precedent.
As noted, the Lee Court found that the case before it was not a
Bruton case because it did not involve the effectiveness of a
limiting jury instruction; instead, Lee was a bench trial, and
the judge acknowledged that he used the codefendant’s
confession as evidence of the other defendant’s guilt.310
Therefore, the Court had to decide whether the confession had
indicia of reliability sufficient to satisfy Roberts.311
The Lee Court noted that the other defendant gave a
confession that partially interlocked with the codefendant’s
304

See supra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57.
306
See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
307
Brief for Respondent at 8, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No.
02-9410), 2003 WL 22228001, at *8-9.
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Id. at *5.
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Id. at *5 n.1.
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confession but ultimately found that the codefendant’s
confession lacked such indicia because there were discrepancies
between the two confessions that were neither irrelevant nor
trivial.312 Accordingly, the Court found that there was a
Confrontation Clause violation under Roberts because “when
the discrepancies between the statements are not insignificant,
the codefendant’s confession may not be admitted.”313
According to the State in Crawford, “‘The logical
inference of this statement is that when the discrepancies
between the statements are insignificant, then the
codefendant’s statement may be admitted’” consistent with
Roberts.314 Under this reading of Lee, if the codefendant’s
confession in Lee completely interlocked with the other
defendant’s confession, the admission of the codefendant’s
confession would not have violated the Confrontation Clause at
the joint bench trial because the confession would have had
adequate indicia of reliability to satisfy Roberts.315
The Crawford Court acknowledged that this was a
“possible inference” from the Lee opinion but found that it was
not an “inevitable one” and declined to draw it.316 Rather, the
Crawford Court concluded that “[i]f Lee had meant
authoritatively to announce an exception—previously unknown
to this Court’s jurisprudence—for interlocking confessions, it
would not have done so in such an oblique manner.”317 The
Court then immediately followed this conclusion with the
following disclaimer: “Our only precedent on interlocking
confessions had addressed the entirely different question
whether a limiting instruction cured prejudice to codefendants
from admitting a defendant’s own confession against him in a
joint trial. See Parker v. Randolph . . . (plurality opinion),
abrogated by Cruz v. New York.”318 Having rejected this
argument, the Court was then able to conclude in the next
sentence of its opinion that its “cases have thus remained
faithful to the Framers’ understanding: Testimonial statements
of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where

312
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315
316
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See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986).
Brief for Respondent, supra note 307, at *6.
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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
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the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”319
According to the Court, then, Lee (which was not a
Bruton doctrine case) was relevant to the question of whether
its cases had remained faithful to the principle that testimonial
hearsay can only be admitted if the declarant is unavailable
and the defendant previously had the opportunity to crossexamine him.320 Conversely, Randolph and Cruz, which were
Bruton doctrine cases, were not relevant to this question but
instead were relevant to “the entirely different question
whether a limiting instruction cured prejudice to codefendants
from admitting a defendant’s own confession against him in a
joint trial.”321 The Lee Court itself had distinguished the case
before it from Bruton: Lee was “not . . . concerned with the
effectiveness of limiting instructions in preventing spill-over
prejudice to a defendant when his codefendant’s confession is
admitted against the codefendant at a joint trial.”322
Indeed, the Court had to reach this conclusion;
otherwise, it would have been necessary for the Court to cite
Randolph as a case that was inconsistent with the Framers’
understanding of the Confrontation Clause (even though
Randolph was only plurality opinion).323 As noted, in Randolph,
several defendants were jointly tried before a jury, and none of
the defendants testified at trial.324 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court found the admission of each defendant’s confession to
police officers admissible, despite the fact that there was no
prior opportunity for confrontation.325 Clearly, each of these
confessions was “testimonial”—meaning that Randolph was
inconsistent with the Framers’ understanding if the Court
presented the Bruton doctrine as an alternative means of
319

Id.
See id.
321
Id. (first emphasis added).
322
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 542 (1986).
323
In the pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause case, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S.
116 (1999), the Supreme Court categorized three separate categories of declarations
against penal interest. The Court placed in one category voluntary admissions offered
against the defendant himself such as confessions covered by the Bruton doctrine. Id.
at 127-28. In another category, the Court considered confessions made by a declarant
offered against a separate criminal defendant at trial. With regard to confessions
falling into this category, the Court concluded that it had issued an “unbroken line of
cases” deeming such confessions inherently unreliable. Id. at 132 & n.2. In a footnote,
the Lilly Court then indicated that its plurality opinion in Dutton v. Evans was “[t]he
only arguable exception to this unbroken line of cases.” Id. at 132 n.2.
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determining constitutional reliability. But the reason why the
Randolph Court found the confessions admissible was not
because they were reliable; it was because they were
insufficiently harmful. After all, each defendant had himself
confessed and devastated his own case.326 Randolph and the
Court’s later opinion in Cruz make clear that the Bruton
doctrine is not an alternative means of determining
constitutional reliability, but rather a test for determining
constitutional harmfulness.327
This leads to the second relevant portion of Crawford.
Earlier in its opinion, in explaining why it disposed of the
adequate indicia of reliability test, the Crawford Court gave
the following explanation and disclaimer:
The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the
adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of
reliability. It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of
assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one. In this respect, it is
very different from exceptions to the Confrontation Clause that
make no claim to be a surrogate means of assessing reliability. For
example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept)
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds;
it does not purport to be an alternative means of determining
reliability.328

As this analysis makes clear, it is equally clear that the
Bruton doctrine does not purport to be an alternative means of
determining reliability. The Cruz Court even noted that a
codefendant’s incriminatory statement can become more
harmful as it becomes more reliable.329
In Davis and Bockting, the Court did later conclude that
the Confrontation Clause is only concerned with testimonial
hearsay.330 But neither of these cases involved joint jury trials
or cited a Bruton doctrine case. Therefore, these holdings are
not directly applicable to the Bruton doctrine.331 Moreover, the
Davis Court reiterated its finding in Crawford that the
testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy does not apply to the
326

See supra notes 97-99.
See supra notes 97-99, 102-05; see also supra notes 142-51 and
accompanying text.
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329
See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
330
See supra notes 199-205, 211 and accompanying text.
331
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, No. 1:09cr414 (JCC), 2010 WL
3909480, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2010) (noting that a statement by the Court that
the Confrontation Clause only covers testimonial hearsay was dicta in relation to the
Bruton doctrine).
327

670

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:2

doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.332 Instead, as the Court
found in Giles v. California (after both Davis and Bockting), if a
defendant intends to and does cause a potential witness
against him to be unavailable at his trial, the prosecution can
admit that witness’s testimonial hearsay without violating the
Confrontation Clause.333 This proposition makes clear that,
despite the Court’s absolutist language in Davis and Bockting,
Crawford’s testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy applies only
to Confrontation Clause cases that hinge on the constitutional
(un)reliability of hearsay. Conversely, in cases such as
forfeiture by wrongdoing—and, by implication, Bruton doctrine
cases—which hinge on entirely different questions, Crawford
should have no effect.
This conclusion is corroborated by the previously
mentioned Bruton doctrine cases decided by lower courts before
Crawford. As noted, courts consistently held that the Bruton
doctrine did not apply to bench trials.334 And, as noted, courts
continue to reach this conclusion after Crawford, even if a
codefendant’s confession is testimonial.335 For instance, in West
v. Jones, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan found that the Bruton doctrine does not
apply to bench trials in the wake of Crawford because a “[t]rial
court[] [is] presumed to consider only properly admitted and
relevant evidence in rendering its decision and to give no
weight to improper testimonial evidence, which is taken under
objection.”336 Conversely, the Bruton doctrine continues to
preclude the admission of certain testimonial hearsay by
codefendants at joint jury trials after Crawford.337
This dichotomy cannot be explained in terms of
constitutional reliability, but it can be explained in terms of
constitutional harmfulness. Obviously, the fact that Herman
Coleman and Anthony West were subjected to a joint bench
trial rather than a joint jury trial did not make Coleman’s prior
confessions to police that West and he committed the crimes
any less testimonial or any more reliable. Therefore, if
Crawford’s testimonial/nontestimonial dichotomy applied,
332
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Coleman’s confession could not have been introduced at their
joint bench trial because West did not have the opportunity to
cross-examine him.338
Crawford did not apply, though, because the prosecution
offered Coleman’s confession only against him.339 Therefore, the
admission of Coleman’s confession could only violate the
Confrontation Clause if it violated the Bruton doctrine. And
Coleman’s confession could only violate the Bruton doctrine if it
was constitutionally harmful—that is, if Coleman in effect
became a witness against West because the trier of fact could
not be trusted to use Coleman’s confession only as evidence of
Coleman’s guilt.340 Because, however unrealistically,341 courts
trust judges more than jurors in this regard, the admission of
codefendant confessions at joint bench trials do not violate the
Confrontation Clause, but not because they are constitutionally
reliable under Crawford.342
Second, as noted,343 courts before Crawford held that
prosecutors could admit confessions by nontestifying
codefendants as long as the names of other defendants were
replaced with neutral pronouns.344 Also as noted,345 courts
continue to allow this practice post-Crawford, even when
codefendant confessions are testimonial.346 Meanwhile,
prosecutors still cannot admit unredacted codefendant
confessions that facially incriminate other defendants without
violating the Bruton doctrine.347 Once again, this dichotomy
cannot be explained in terms of constitutional reliability, but it
can be explained in terms of constitutional harmfulness.
338

See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968) (“Plainly, the
introduction of Evans’ confession added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to
the Government’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since Evans did not
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339
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341
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confessions as evidence of other defendants’ guilt. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
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A codefendant’s confession redacted to replace the other
defendants’ names with neutral pronouns is no less testimonial
and no more reliable than a confession admitted in its original
form. Indeed, in a certain sense, such a confession is less
reliable: it is not the actual confession given by the codefendant
but rather an altered version created by the court.348 But
according to courts, jurors are more likely to respect a jury
instruction to use a redacted confession as evidence of only the
confessor’s guilt.349 In its opinion in Cruz, the Court found that
the case before it, which involved interlocking confessions, was
“indistinguishable from Bruton with respect to those factors
the Court has deemed relevant in this area: the likelihood that
the instruction will be disregarded, . . . the probability that
such disregard will have a devastating effect, . . . and the
determinability of these facts in advance of trial.”350 Conversely,
courts have found that cases involving sufficiently redacted
confessions are distinguishable from Bruton because there is
less likelihood that jurors will disregard limiting instructions.351
On the other hand, cases with nontestimonial
codefendant confessions are indistinguishable from Bruton
with respect to the factors that are relevant to the Bruton
doctrine. As noted, in Bruton, Evans confessed to a postal
inspector that Bruton and he committed armed robbery.352 The
Bruton Court found that the admission of Evans’s confession
along with an instruction telling jurors only to use the
confession as evidence of his guilt violated the Confrontation
Clause because of the likelihood that the jury would disregard
the jury instruction, creating a devastating effect to Bruton’s
defense.353 Moreover, unlike with a nonfacially incriminatory
confession,354 the Court could reach this conclusion in advance
of trial without wondering about what evidence might be
presented at trial.
If Evans had made this same confession to his mother,
brother, lover, or acquaintance, this analysis would not change.
This is because, “[w]hether or not it is testimonial, a
348

As Justice Scalia noted in his dissenting opinion in Gray v. Maryland, 523
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defendant’s extrajudicial statement directly implicating a codefendant is equally susceptible to improper use by the jury
against that co-defendant.”355 And if the codefendant’s
statement is facially incriminatory, the court should equally be
able to determine these issues before trial.356 Therefore, there is
no sound reason for courts to find that nontestimonial
statements fall outside the scope of the Bruton doctrine.
B.

Nontestimonial Hearsay Should Still Be Held to Violate
a Deconstitutionalized Version of the Bruton Doctrine

This article asserts that lower courts have erred in
applying Bruton through a Crawford lens. These courts have
held that the admission at a joint jury trial of a nontestifying
codefendant’s
nontestimonial
statement
that
facially
incriminates another defendant no longer violates the
Confrontation Clause and likely does not violate any other
constitutional provision.357 Such an interpretation, however,
only resolves the Confrontation Clause issue, not the issue of
whether the admission of such a nontestimonial statement
violates the rules of evidence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, along with most state
counterparts, provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
355
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See id.
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misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”358
Meanwhile, Federal Rule of Evidence 105 and most state
counterparts359 provide that “[w]hen evidence which is
admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to
its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”360 Moreover,
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403 indicates that “[i]n
reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair
prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable
effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.”361
Finally, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 states, “If the
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment, an
information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a
defendant or the government, the court may order separate
trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any
other relief that justice requires.”362
Under these Rules, it is well established that the
introduction of evidence against a codefendant at a joint jury
trial can violate the rules of evidence if it is inadmissible
against other defendants.363 In such cases, the court needs to
decide whether jurors would adhere to an instruction to use the
evidence only against the codefendant and whether the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice to the other defendants.364
The Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v.
Figueroa365 is instructive on this issue and strikingly similar to
the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Bruton. In Figueroa, in
1979, Jose Figueroa, Angel Lebron, and Ralph Acosta were
convicted after a joint jury trial of conspiracy to possess heroin
and possession of heroin.366 At trial, the prosecution had
presented evidence of Acosta’s 1968 conviction for selling
heroin, and the judge issued a specific limiting instruction that
told jurors to use the conviction only as evidence of Acosta’s
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
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guilt.367 The Second Circuit subsequently determined that this
conviction was inadmissible and reversed Acosta’s conviction.368
This left the Second Circuit with the question of
whether it also needed to reverse the convictions of Figueroa
and Lebron. According to the court, “[w]hen evidence is offered
against one defendant in a joint trial, determination of
admissibility against that defendant resolves only the Rule 403
balancing as to him, i.e., that the probative value of the
evidence in his ‘case’ is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice to him.”369 When that evidence also “creates a
significant risk of prejudice to the co-defendants, a further
issue arises as to whether the evidence is admissible in a joint
trial, even though limited by cautionary instructions to the
‘case’ of a single defendant.”370
The court then noted that in some cases, “the evidence is
admitted against one defendant, leaving the issue as to the codefendants to be resolved solely under the severance standards
of Fed.R.Crim.P. 14.”371 Conversely, “other cases have viewed the
issue solely in terms of admissibility, i.e., admissibility in a joint
trial.”372 Because the district court allowed for the admission of
Acosta’s conviction at the joint trial, the Second Circuit had to
decide whether the admission of that conviction violated Rule
403 and necessitated a new trial.373
According to the Second Circuit, there is a spectrum of
harm that results from the introduction of evidence admissible
against one codefendant but inadmissible against other
defendants.374 At one extreme is the introduction of gardenvariety, prior bad-act evidence against one codefendant, which
the court deemed “far too tenuous to bar admissibility of
evidence in a joint trial.”375 Conversely, “[a]t the other extreme is
the high risk of prejudice to co-defendants when evidence of a
defendant’s prior act, like a Bruton confession, tends to prove
directly, or even by strong implication, that the co-defendants
also participated in the prior act.”376 The court found that
“[u]nlike a Bruton confession, prior act evidence is not so
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
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inevitably prejudicial to co-defendants that the worth of limiting
instructions can be totally discounted.”377 Nonetheless, the
Second Circuit concluded that Acosta’s conviction was closer to a
Bruton confession than traditional prior bad-act evidence and
reversed the convictions of Figueroa and Lebron.378 The Second
Circuit is not alone in this conclusion. Courts across the country
at both the federal379 and state380 levels have found that evidence
admissible against one codefendant but inadmissible against
other defendants at a joint trial violates Rule 403 or prompts the
need for severance under Rule 14.
Bruton makes sense in connection with Figueroa and
these other cases. Basically, the Bruton Court concluded that
because codefendant confessions are at the top of the spectrum
of harm, their admission at joint jury trials is not merely
evidentiary error, but constitutional error if the codefendant
does not testify at trial.381 Even a finding that Crawford indeed
places nontestimonial hearsay beyond the scope of the Bruton
doctrine would merely resolve the constitutional issue, not the
underlying evidentiary issue. That is, if the admission of
nontestimonial, facially incriminatory confessions at joint jury
trials by nontestifying codefendants no longer violates the
Confrontation Clause, their admission still creates a high risk
of prejudice to other defendants because they tend to prove
directly that the other defendants committed the charged
crime.382 Such codefendant confession cases, then, are the
paradigmatic cases in which courts should sever the
defendants’ trials or find that the nontestimonial confession
cannot be admitted consistent with Rule 403.
Interestingly, however, litigants and courts seem to
have missed this point in the wake of Crawford. Courts
continue to hold that the introduction of less prejudicial
evidence admissible against only one codefendant can violate
Rule 403 based upon the spillover effect (i.e., the effect that
377
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admission of evidence against one defendant can have on other
defendants).383 But when presented with nontestimonial
codefendant confessions—the most prejudicial codefendant
evidence384—they now curtly conclude that these confessions are
beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine and fail to conduct a
Rule 403 or Rule 14 analysis. Indeed, in none of the previous
cases cited in this article finding a nontestimonial codefendant
confession beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine did the
court address severability or admissibility under these Rules.385
In fact, the only court to address these Rules after
finding that nontestimonial hearsay is beyond the scope of the
Bruton doctrine was the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in its 2009 opinion Thomas v. United States.386 In Thomas,
Keith Thomas and Ron Herndon were charged with “firstdegree premeditated murder while armed [as well as in]
possession of a firearm during a crime of violence” and jointly
tried before a jury.387 During a break in trial, Thomas was
placed in a holding cell with Danny Winston, who was charged
with a different murder, and told him that he was with Ron
when Ron shot the victim.388 Thomas did not testify at trial, but
the prosecution called Winston to testify regarding Thomas’s
confession, with Ron Herndon’s name replaced with the neutral
pronoun “someone.”389
After he was convicted, Herndon appealed, claiming
that the admission of Thomas’s confession violated the Bruton
doctrine and the Washington, D.C., counterpart to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 14.390 The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit disagreed with Herndon’s former argument,
finding that “if a defendant’s extrajudicial statement
inculpating a co-defendant is not testimonial, Bruton does not
apply, because admission of the uncensored statement in
evidence at a joint trial would not infringe the co-defendant’s
Sixth Amendment rights, whether or not the statement fits
within a hearsay exception.”391
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With regard to Herndon’s second argument, however,
the court concluded that “[w]hether or not it is testimonial, a
defendant’s extrajudicial statement directly implicating a codefendant is equally susceptible to improper use by the jury
against that co-defendant.”392 Accordingly, the court found that
“[a] defendant’s non-testimonial out-of-court statement
therefore remains a candidate for redaction (or other remedial
measures) under Criminal Rule 14 unless it fits within a
hearsay exception rendering it admissible against the nondeclarant co-defendant.”393 Therefore, if the trial court had not
redacted Thomas’s confession, its admission would have
constituted potentially reversible error, but because the trial
court replaced Herndon’s name with a neutral pronoun, there
was no such error.394 In other words, even if nontestimonial
hearsay is beyond the scope of the Bruton doctrine after
Crawford, courts can still find reversible error under Rule 14 or
Rule 403 based upon “the same considerations-whether [the codefendant]’s extrajudicial statements (with or without excisions)
so ‘powerfully’ incriminated [the other defendants] as to create a
‘substantial risk’ that a reasonable jury would be unable to follow
the court’s limiting instruction and would consider those
statements in deciding [the other defendants’] guilt.”395 To the
extent that defense attorneys are not arguing that the admission
of nontestimonial codefendant confessions violates Rule 14 or
Rule 403 as a fallback argument to the traditional
Bruton/Confrontation Clause argument, they should now advance
such arguments. And, as the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Thomas
makes clear, courts should treat these rules-based arguments in
the same way as they would Bruton-based constitutional
arguments and find that the admission of facially incriminatory
nontestimonial statements by codefendants constitutes
evidentiary error unless they are sufficiently redacted.396
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Of course, if Crawford did indeed deconstitutionalize Bruton with regard to
nontestimonial hearsay, state courts, as opposed to federal courts, would no longer be
bound by the Supreme Court’s Bruton doctrine precedent in cases involving
nontestimonial hearsay. See generally Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
As the above analysis makes clear, however, state courts should easily be able to find
that the admission of nontestimonial codefendant confessions violates Rule 14 and/or
Rule 403.
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CONCLUSION
In Cruz v. New York, the Supreme Court rejected the
argument that interlocking confessions were beyond the scope
of the Bruton doctrine because they had adequate indicia of
reliability to satisfy the Ohio v. Roberts test.397 In rejecting this
argument, the Court cautioned that “[t]he law cannot command
respect if such an inexplicable exception to a supposed
constitutional imperative is adopted. Having decided Bruton,
we must face the honest consequences of what it holds.”398
By finding that nontestimonial hearsay is beyond the
scope of the Bruton doctrine, courts have created such an
inexplicable exception and failed to face the honest
consequences of what Bruton holds. Like a case involving an
interlocking confession, a case involving a nontestimonial
confession is “indistinguishable from Bruton with respect to
those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this area: the
likelihood that the instruction will be disregarded, . . . the
probability that such disregard will have a devastating
effect, . . . and the determinability of these factors in advance of
trial.”399 These factors do not depend to any extent on whether a
codefendant confesses to a police officer, a confidential
informant, a mother, a brother, a lover, or a friend. These
latter, casual confessions are constitutionally reliable according
to the test set forth in Crawford, but the Bruton doctrine does
not depend upon the unreliability of codefendant confessions; it
depends upon their constitutional harmfulness. It depends
upon how much damage the admission of such a confession
would cause to other defendants at trial, not upon whether the
confessor thought that the statement would be available for use
at a later trial.
Moreover, even if Crawford deconstitutionalized the
Bruton doctrine with regard to nontestimonial hearsay because
it is constitutionally reliable, “[w]hether or not it is testimonial,
a defendant’s extrajudicial statement directly implicating a codefendant is equally susceptible to improper use by the jury
against that co-defendant.”400 Therefore, even if such confessions
are admissible despite the Confrontation Clause, courts should
find that their admission violates the rules of evidence.
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